Introduction
In England, local planning authorities can impose planning obligations and charge infrastructure levies on landowners upon grant of planning permission so long as they do not jeopardise the economic viability of the proposed development. A development viability appraisal (DVA) tests economic viability. It is a financial model that is based on the 'residual method' of land valuation because the residual amount is that which is left to bid for the land after deducting the estimated costs associated with a development from the estimated value of the completed scheme. As well as construction costs and risk-adjusted return to the developer, the cost of planning obligations and Community Infrastructure Levy (CIL) must also be deducted from the development value. If there is a positive residual amount that is sufficient to persuade the landowner to sell, this indicates economic viability.
DVAs are typically carried out at two stages in the planning process: the policy setting or forward planning stage and the scheme-specific development control stage. This paper focuses on the latter but builds on previous research that has examined the application of development appraisal theory and practice at the area-wide level. That research identified a number of issues inherent in development appraisal modelling in general, and particular issues concerning the application to DVA Coleman et al, 2012; Crosby et al, 2013) . This paper categorises these modelling issues and develops a set of research questions, which are addressed using a case study methodology based on planning appeal decisions.
The next section of this paper reviews the existing literature on development appraisal modelling and sets it within the context of development viability. Section 3 introduces the objectives, research method and primary data source. Section 4 sets out the findings and these are discussed in detail in Section 5 before concluding in Section 6. Christophers (2013) notes that the first official recognition of viability in planning was in relation to the delivery of affordable housing through the use of planning obligations. UK Government Planning Circular 6/98 (DETR, 1998) advised local authorities to ensure financially viability when negotiating the amount of affordable housing that could be supplied from a development scheme. Circular 05/2005 05/ (ODPM, 2005 provided guidance for planners when testing the economic viability of planning obligations: viability was defined as a site's ability to remain sufficiently "profitable" at a given level of planning obligations. As the idea of viability testing took hold, its remit was extended from sitespecific development management to forward planning. Planning Policy Statement 12 (DCLG, 2008) authorities are able to set a CIL to help pay for offsite infrastructure. As with planning obligations, a CIL is also subject to a viability test.
Literature review
The National Planning Policy Framework supersedes earlier planning policy in relation to planning obligations but retains the need for forward plans to ensure that "...the scale of development identified in the plan should not be subject to such a scale of obligations and policy burdens that their ability to be developed viably is threatened" (NPPF, 2012: 41) .
More specifically, with regard to the issue of viability in particular, the level of planning obligations 1 SI 2010 No 948 "... should, when taking account of the normal cost of development and mitigation, provide competitive returns to a willing land owner and willing developer to enable the development to be deliverable" (DCLG, 2012: 41) Financial viability appraisals are therefore necessary to assess the extent to which a planning policy can be met or the extent to which adverse impacts of development can be mitigated.
To determine viability, the estimated site values are benchmarked against a 'threshold land value' (a value at and above which landowners are assumed to be prepared to sell) and therefore the basis on which this threshold is established and the level at which it is set is critical to DVA at the policy-setting (area-wide) level. If the estimated site values are higher than the threshold land value, the policy target is considered viable. Site-specific DVAs, which are the focus of this paper, use the same residual land valuation approach as area-wide DVAs but incorporate more detail about the proposed development scheme. Coleman, et al. (2012) describe the development viability modelling process. Land valuation models can be very simple, take a single snapshot in time approach and assess the difference between the value of any completed development and the costs of providing that development, including any planning obligations and a reasonable return to the developer.
The difference between development value and cost is known as the residual land value; it is the amount available for the landowner and is compared to the threshold land value. Cash flow applications can be applied to this basic model but still produce a residual land value at a single point in time.
Focusing on the inability of basic residual valuation techniques to deal with multi-site appraisals and market shifts through time, Coleman et al (2012) and Crosby et al (2013) raise a number of issues concerning the application of development appraisal to DVA within the UK planning system. Essentially, policy is set for wide areas and enforced over long periods of time and the viability testing methods struggle to deal with this. The main difficulties can be summarised as: spatially and temporally extrapolating from a set of time-specific hypothetical sites to actual development sites; confusion over whether to forecast growth in revenue and inflation in costs; and the impact on marginal sites of using levies and planning obligation targets that are based on land use and size thresholds rather than value. The research concluded that decisions within the planning system were not adopting a consistent approach to the assessment of land value within a residual valuation framework.
This paper develops that critical evaluation of area-wide DVA into a scheme-specific context. 
Estimation of scheme-specific development profit
The profit sum is usually expressed as a simple ratio, for example, a proportion of total costs or a margin on gross development value. These ratios are not sensitive to the development period. For instance, all else being equal, the profit level (if expressed as a ratio of development costs or value) would be the same for a one or ten year scheme. The literature on investment appraisal identifies that a periodic rate of return should be applied and this is a risk adjusted rate of return which equates the cash flow from the development to its cost. An appraisal input that expresses profit as a ratio of total cost or development value is, therefore, unlikely to be the same as the outturn profit.
In addressing this, two difficulties arise. First, what is an acceptable or appropriate riskadjusted market return for development activity and, associated with this, how is riskadjusted return to the developer apportioned between the profit margin and the contingency allowance? Given location and scheme heterogeneity and market volatility, it will depend on the type of developer, type and location of the development and the state of the market.
Moreover, there can be substantial volatility within the project cash flow itself (Geltner, et al. 2007: chapter 29) . Second, estimating a required rate of return for development opportunities requires data that typically do not exist or assumptions that are difficult to verify.
Handling of development finance
The academic literature summarized in Coleman, et al. (2012) criticizes development project appraisals for assuming 100% debt finance. This approach is at odds with most real development projects which source finance from a combination of debt and equity. This has important implications for the development profit metric; what is the 'correct' measure of developer return?
Combining the two issues of profit specification and finance, there are also questions concerning the different levels of these inputs for different property types and for different forms of the same property type; affordable versus standard housing for example.
Input uncertainty
The summary of the academic and practice literature in Coleman, et al. (2012) also identified that it is common practice to incorporate current values and costs in a development appraisal.
For schemes expected to take a long time to complete or undertaken in phases, the cost and value estimates at the time of the planning application may change significantly. Although two approaches have evolved to handle this -re-appraisals and projection models -often no forecasting of costs or revenue is undertaken, due no doubt to the level of uncertainty surrounding future value change.
Normal valuation uncertainty surrounds estimates of current levels of costs and revenues.
However, the very nature of the residual valuation method means that the land value output from a DVA is very sensitive to changes in development value, costs and timing in particular, and many of the other inputs are ratios of these key inputs (e.g. professional fees and transaction costs). The risk associated with this uncertainty is often quantified in the residual valuation by including a contingency allowance or by adopting a suitably high risk-adjusted return to the risk-taker. In some appraisals more sophisticated risk analysis techniques may be employed such as probability analysis and simulation modelling. A concern is how these various risk management techniques work together; is risk double-counted for example?
Estimation of land value
The output from a DVA is a residual land value of the site -a value determined by its development potential. This can be compared to the value of the site in its current use to determine the size of the uplift in land value. If this uplift is enough to persuade the landowner release the land for development then the site is deemed viable. However, the landowner's decision may be influenced by a number of issues; current and potential future market states, the size of uplift compared to the current use value, the size of the uplift compared to the cost of the planning obligations, any legitimate alternative use value and the landowner's expectations of how policy may change are examples. Another influence particularly relevant to this paper is any expectation that they can use the current planning policy framework to reduce the amount of planning obligations that will have to be paid.
This issue may also be influential in determining the price a developer may be prepared to pay the landowner.
Previous research indicates a lack of consensus regarding either the derivation or level of an acceptable uplift in land value. Nearly half of the studies investigated by Coleman et al (2012) regarded a scheme as viable if the residual land value exceeded current or alternative use value. A similar number added a premium of 15-30% of either the current or alternative use value as an incentive to the landowner to sell. A minority of studies specified market value as a benchmark, the basis suggested in industry guidance published by the Royal
Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS, 2012b).
Clearly the landowner requires some level of financial incentive over and above current use value. Estimating this incentive is difficult because it attempts to quantify the amount of land value uplift that should go to the landowner and the amount that should go to the community. It is, essentially, a question of how the uplift in land value should be distributed.
So the key unresolved question concerns the appropriate allocation of the uplift between landowner and community.
As indicated earlier, if there is uncertainty over the level of planning obligations payable then this will increase the option value element of land value due to increased volatility (Titman, 1985) , thus increasing land prices. This can lead to higher land prices in the market and a threshold land value that is based on market value will also increase. Developers will appeal The concepts "competitive returns to a willing landowner", "price acceptable to the landowner" and "appropriate site value for the landowner" are included in the National
Planning Policy Framework (2014) and, whilst the words 'competitive', 'acceptable' and 'appropriate' are somewhat nebulous, it is generally accepted that the landowner should receive an additional sum over and above the amount that they could sell the site assuming that it remained in its current use.
Industry guidance has attempted to define the uplift as "...the value at which a typical willing landowner is likely to release land for development, before payment of taxes..." (LHDG, 2012: 28) . If a site has no possibility of permission for an alternative use then the starting point is based on its current use only. If there is a prospect of permission for alternative use(s) (for example, in a development plan for an alternative use) there may be a higher alternative use value. If the site has planning consent for an alternative use then a higher land value usually results. The alternative use land value then becomes the starting point for assessing the size of the uplift, although this use may also have planning obligations attached, which complicates the issue. The actual price at which a landowner would sell will, by definition, be a market price but because market transactions of development sites are not frequent and sites are seldom comparable, valuers are often required to provide estimates of market price -market value. Market value is defined as an exchange price (IVS 2013) and should price in planning policy requirements. In practical terms the identification of residual land value, current use value, alternative use value and market value requires myriad assumptions and this is confounding the setting of policy and the drafting of guidance.
Research questions and data
The review of viability modelling issues identified from the literature in Section 2 identifies two major strands. The first relates to the application of development appraisal techniques, namely the precise modelling approach and the nature of the inputs used within the model.
These include uncertainty surrounding the inputs, the assumptions regarding developer's profit and the treatment of finance. The second strand relates to the way in which the model is used to share out the profits of development between the community, the developer and the landowner.
The research objectives relate to both of these strands: the first is to identify how the residual model is being used within development viability assessment at the scheme level, with particular emphasis on the treatment of input uncertainty and the approach to finance and developer's return/profit. This includes the identification of any variability within these approaches. The second objective is to identify the approach to "profit" sharing or threshold land value and whether this approach is changing or has changed through time.
The primary data source for the research is a sample of planning appeals that relate to development viability assessments. These cases were accessed from those uploaded to the Planning Portal 3 as of the 20 November 2014. The main search criterion was cases that had references to planning obligations. A further refinement was that only appeals made by landowners, developers and house-builders were selected. The search returned 99 appeal cases. Supporting documentation was available from the local authority websites for 32 cases and these formed the core data set. This documentation included proofs of evidence, valuation reports, DVAs and independent reviews of DVAs. The appeal reports and supporting material were subjected to a document analysis in order to isolate the approach taken by the planning inspector in reaching the decision, identify the method(s) adopted, inputs used and the evidence for those inputs. In some cases full details of the decisions and the evidence behind the arguments was available and in some cases only partial information could be found. Most importantly, the evidence and the decision were analysed to identify the approach to threshold land value.
Critical review of the appeals

Application of development appraisal modelling
The modelling approach 
Input uncertainty
It is widely accepted that input uncertainty is a major issue in valuation as a whole (IVS, 2014) and in development appraisal in particular (Coleman, et al. 2012) . Risk analysis in the form of basic sensitivity analysis had only been intermittently undertaken in the appeal cases and the impact this had on the decision is unclear within inspector reports. 
Profit and finance
There is no evidence from the appraisals that there is a generally accepted level of profit from development. In evidence for the Clay Farm and Glebe Farm, Cambridge appeal (APP/Q0505/A/09/2103592 & 99) the developer's target return was quoted to be in the band of 18% to 21% of GDV. In the Jericho Canalside, Oxford appeal (APP/G3110/A/08/2070447) it was agreed that the target should be 15% of GDV or 20% of costs although they also agreed that this was site specific and would vary depending on the state of the market, the site and the scheme. However, in the majority of cases where the level of developer's profit is discussed, figures equal to or in excess of the two targets agreed at Jericho were used. In the Shinfield Road, Reading case (APP/X0360/A/12/2179141) the Inspector determined that:
"The appellants supported their calculations by providing letters and emails from six national house-builders who set out their net profit margin targets for residential developments. The figures ranged from 17% to 28%, with the usual target being in the range 20-25%."
In this case, in the model put forward by the appellant, the default settings were 20% of GDV for private sales and 10% of GDV for affordable housing (and 20% of costs for commercial land use), resulting in a blended target profit margin of 18% of GDV. Larger schemes are regarded as more risky, hence the relatively high benchmark set for the Shinfield Road site, which was for 126 dwellings. In the Poplar Business Park case (APP/E5900/A/217892) the profit margin for affordable housing was assumed to be 7% of GDV, and the scheme was regarded as unviable.
Given that not all of the development viability appraisals were based on the standard residual model but had elements of cash flow within them, it might be expected that the pre-finance rate of return and the project rate of return would have been preferred benchmarks but this was not the case. Even when IRR was calculated, it was the basic ratios of profit to GDV and/or cost which dominated discussions on viability.
Assumptions regarding finance are linked to those relating to profit. One hundred per cent debt financing appears to be universal and unchallenged and even the finance rate appears non-contentious with 7% adopted in four out of five cases where it is mentioned.
Threshold land value
The determination and role of land value in development viability assessment is the key battleground within the appeals. The main issue centres on whether a policy-compliant level of planning obligations can be supported by the scheme whilst ensuring an acceptable return to the landowner. As described in Section 2, within the residual valuation framework, the uncertainty surrounding valuations gives parties to the case scope to vary the inputs and the outcomes. However, over and above this valuation variation, there is also scope for a more conceptual scrutiny of the application of residual valuation models and the subsequent determination of 'threshold land value', below which it is assumed the landowner would not be prepared to sell and therefore development land would not come forward.
Price paid for site
In a number of cases, developers owning sites have sought to determine the level of threshold land value by reference to the price they paid for the site. This raises an important practical question about the assumptions made by both sellers and purchasers. Purchasers could have paid too little or too much for a site based on inaccurate assumptions; perhaps purchasers' expectations in terms of planning permission were unrealistic for example. Also, 'perceived' high and low prices may be due to the fact that prices are a distribution. There is an extensive real estate literature on valuation accuracy and bias that suggests a wide variation in valuations and prices, especially in commercial markets (RICS/IPD, 2013); with development sites being cited as one of the most variable situations within negligence cases (Crosby, et al. 1998 ).
This is not surprising given that development land values are residuals and highly geared in relation to development values and costs It would appear that developers attempting to use the price they paid for the site in DVA are not succeeding if it is decided that either they overpaid for the site by not taking the correct level of planning obligations into account when purchasing or the price is too historic.
Where the price is recent and perceived to be 'correct', it might be taken into account. 
Market value
The 'market value' approach used by the inspector in the Flambard's case appears to be recommended by the RICS (RICS, 2012b: 12) but it necessarily assumes all planning obligation policies are fully reflected in the valuation. The market value approach was used in Holsworthy (APP/W1145/Q/13/2204429) and in King Street, London (APP/H5390/A/13/2209347), although it is not clear whether market value was based on policy-compliant assumptions.
Alternative use value is also relevant in development viability modelling. It is defined as the market value taking into account viable alternative, policy-compliant, uses. For it to be a relevant alternative to current use value, it must be assumed that all policy-compliant obligations have been factored into the alternative use value, so reducing its value to one that can support these obligations.
Other cases
There have been a number of cases where it didn't really matter what approach was used. In the 2009 appeal on a site situated on Streatham Rd, Mitcham (APP/T5720/A/08/2087666) the appellant argued that the RLV ignoring planning obligations would have to be below £359,000 (compared to a purchase price of £1.6m) for some affordable housing to be viable.
The council argued that the purchase price was not relevant to the decision on how much affordable housing was viable and that current and alternative use values were the appropriate bases for threshold land value. In this particular case no amount of affordable housing was viable so the Inspector's decision did not provide any detailed comments on the basis for land value. The same thing happened in a number of subsequent appeals where the site value for a proposed development, even when planning obligations were nil, was below existing or alternative use value; they were not viable within the context of current planning policy (for 
Sharing the uplift in value between the landowner and the LPA
Instead of trying to determine a threshold land value that would induce the landowner to deliver the site to the market, and a target level of planning obligations that the local authority requires, an alternative approach is to share the uplift in some way between these parties.
The approach requires two valuations; current (or alternative) use value and RLV that ignores 
Discussion
The grant of planning permission can produce significant uplifts in land value and planning policy in England now acknowledges that the three major stakeholders (landowners, developers and the community) can all participate in that added value. But the mechanism by which this participation is implemented is not straightforward. There is evidence from recorded planning appeals within England of a confused picture concerning the ability to determine the correct framework for assessing appropriate returns to developer, landowner and community. For example, developer's return is highly site and market specific and significantly influenced by project finance structure. To date, the industry's response to these issues is to adopt broad rules of thumb regarding levels of developer and landowner return and to assume very simplistic financial structures. While some of this generality might (arguably) be acceptable for area-wide DVAs, it does not seem appropriate for site-specific DVAs.
One of the main problems with development appraisal is the sensitivity of the residual output to changes brought about by input uncertainty and time. Individual site values are more volatile than the values of developed real estate assets. Consequently fixing cost and value inputs through time magnifies the geared changes in RLV. Figure 1 illustrates this point.
The solid line tracks changes in the average price of new dwellings in England between 1996
and 2012 whereas the dashed line tracks changes in residual land value for residential land in
England based on national average house prices and build costs. Fixing a threshold land value through this volatility means that the apportionment of uplift between landowner and community will vary considerably over time.
Figure 1 -Residual land values for residential land use in England
There is little argument within both government policy and industry guidance that a developer should be able to obtain an appropriate risk-adjusted return from a development scheme. The landowner will therefore receive the RLV that remains after the costs of development (including developer's profit and planning obligations) have been deducted from the estimated value of the completed development (gross development value). The central issue is the determination of threshold land value at which, it is assumed, a landowner would be prepared to sell.
The residual valuation is a recognised method for assessing the market value of development land and it gives some weight to guidance put forward by the RICS that the market value of a -£2,000,000 -£1,000,000 £0 £1,000,000 £2,000,000 £3,000,000 £4,000,000 £5,000,000 £0 £50,000 £100,000 £150,000
£200,000 development site should be the basis for threshold land value. At any point in time the RLV (the market value of a development site) will reflect relevant policy on planning obligations, i.e. the 'cost' of these obligations are included in the valuation as an input. Theoretically, a landowner should be willing to sell development land when its RLV is higher than current use value and the price reflects the new use. On this basis there does not appear to be a problem and the RICS guidance is correct.
However, it appears that this model may have been misapplied in practice. Some of this misapplication surrounds the crucial market value special assumption concerning the inclusion of policy-compliant planning obligation assumptions. If they are not fully taken into account, landowners and developers can manipulate the situation to their financial benefit.
In the appeals, some appellants have argued that the market value of the site should not be used and the historic purchase price for the site should be used instead. However, Planning
Inspectors in a number of cases have identified this as an attempt to shift some of the risk of development activity from the developer to the community even though developers use riskadjusted profit margins in their original decision-making. One of the significant risks associated with development is input uncertainty caused by market changes over time. Once land price has been fixed at the commencement of the developer's involvement, the impact of subsequent market changes will fall on the developer. If they are able to shift any downside risk associated with these market shifts onto the community by fixing the land price in any subsequent viability appraisal, that appraisal should incorporate a more moderately riskadjusted return to the developer in order to reflect the reduced level of risk. There was no evidence of such risk adjustment by appellants trying to use purchase price in DVAs. The actual price paid should play no part in any development viability negotiations or modelling.
If the use of market value is deemed to be the correct approach, as indicated above, its practical derivation is problematic. Normal valuation practice is to assess developments with relatively homogeneous characteristics by direct capital value comparison using a unit of comparison such as a price per square metre or, for residential land, price per hectare with suitable adjustments for location and physical differences. For more individual development sites, especially in the commercial sector, a residual method is used (see RICS guidance notes on comparative valuations (RICS, 2012a) and development land (RICS, 2008) ).
In the appeals, DVA was based on the residual method but the direct comparison method was often used to determine either (1) the land value input in cases where profit was the output or (2) the benchmark against which to compare the RLV output, ignoring planning obligations, to determine the appropriate level of planning obligations. This introduces an element of circularity into the appraisal, which can be used by appellants to their advantage. If the land value used in the viability assessment is derived from sales of similar sites, developers can argue that the land value benchmark should be based on these transactions -it is prima facie evidence of market value. In fallen markets this may not be as favourable as using historic price but is the next best alternative for landowners/developers.
There is little difference in using market values based on direct comparison than using the actual price, apart from any market movements between sale price and valuation date. If market values of comparable sites are used as the basis for the determination of threshold land value, the critical assumption is that the comparable evidence is adjusted to take account of current policy in relation to planning obligations. If this were done correctly within a residual valuation framework, the market valuation would necessarily confirm that the policy compliant planning obligations were affordable and there would be no reduction in planning policy obligations on appeal, precisely because of the circularity issue. The input land values are adjusted to take account of the cost of planning obligations, and those are the obligations that the DVA is trying to estimate. Hence both the use of either a current purchase price or a current market value therefore suffers from the same issue. If the price and the valuation are correct under the planning obligation policy special assumption, they will automatically confirm that the policy planning obligations are affordable.
The planning obligations will only be unviable if the market value subject to the assumption concerning policy compliant planning obligations is less than the current use value. It is unclear whether planning inspectors realise that actual purchase prices and market valuations of comparable sites raise the same circularity issue. What is clear is that a number of decisions have used purchase price or market value based on comparable transaction evidence and this is an open invitation for developers to overpay for sites in the knowledge that the current application of DVA will enable them to use these prices in assessing reduced levels of planning obligations; either directly by inserting the price or indirectly by using the prices as comparables for market valuations.
What is the solution? In early cases, one approach was to adopt EUV plus a premium to persuade landowners to release the land. However, this takes no account of the substantial variations in the uplift from current use value to RLV. For example, a planning consent to allow residential development on a greenfield site can generate a very large uplift in land value whereas a consent to change the use of a brownfield site from commercial to residential land use might generate a much smaller uplift. The greenfield site would require a very substantial premium to persuade a landowner to sell. In a number of the appeal cases current use value was above RLV even before any planning obligations were deducted. In these cases no planning obligations were required. Effectively the current use value plus a premium approach is confounded by the heterogeneity of development sites.
Finally, we are left with the approach that was adopted in the appeal involving the site at Shinfield Road, Reading (op cit). In that case the landowner and community shared the land value uplift equally. This approach addresses the issue of changing viability through time and avoids the circularity issue that afflicts threshold land values that are based on market values or purchase price. It does not resolve any of the difficulties associated with input uncertainty. But those are inherent within the residual valuation method and no resistance to the use of this method in DVA was found in the appeal cases, despite the theoretical and practical criticisms levelled at it (see Coleman, et al. 2013 , Crosby, et al. 2013 . The decision in the Shinfield case amounted to a proportionate sharing of the land value uplift, essentially a tax on the development gain. Consequently, despite its advantages over alternative approaches, it might be viewed as a politically difficult solution to implement. 
Conclusions
This research has examined appeal cases relating to scheme-specific DVAs where the level of planning obligations was one of the issues in dispute and identified threshold land value as the main point of contention. The present position is confused and conflicting. There is evidence within appeal cases that planners, planning inspectors and surveyors acting as evidence providers are doing so within a poor quality modelling environment. There is little evidence that the financial theories underpinning appraisals and rates of return are understood and consequently models are not being applied consistently. The appeal cases have provided evidence that the institutional background has not supplied the expertise necessary to carry out rigorous development modelling in the English planning system and that educators, trainers, learned societies, and industry have failed to deliver this expertise. In particular, the research questions whether planning inspectors are sufficiently versed in the expertise of development appraisal and finance to be able to spot the inconsistencies. Their decisions are evidence that they cannot.
The paper has scrutinised the various approaches to determining land value and supported the view that the use of the historic purchase price is flawed as it attempts to transfer one of the primary risks of development -changes in market state and its impact on costs and values within the development -to the community. The risk-adjusted rate of return already rewards developers for taking these risks.
In addition the paper suggests that the market value approach is only theoretically correct if applied as per the assumptions set out in the RICS Guidance Note. A correct application of market value would protect the community from changes in market state and ensure that any site brought forward for development would be able to provide policy-compliant planning obligations. If market value is based on comparable evidence without proper adjustment to reflect policy compliant planning obligations, this introduces a circularity, which encourages developers to overpay for sites and try to recover some or all of this overpayment via reductions in planning obligations. However, a correct interpretation of market value would not persuade landowners to bring forward sites for development in weak land markets and so acts against the policy imperative. This is also the case as the residual approach to valuation does not take into account the option value of holding onto land due to the volatile nature of land value illustrated in Figure 1 .
A possible solution lies in the use of current use value but, if that is not related to the development in any way, it becomes a very blunt instrument that takes no account of a landowner's perspective when deciding to bring a site forward for development.
The problem centres on the difficulty in selecting an appropriate threshold land value, whether it is reliant upon purchase price, comparison-based market value or current use value plus a premium. One solution is to avoid setting a threshold land value altogether. By estimating current use value and a RLV that ignores planning obligations, the Shinfield appeal case split the uplift in value between the landowner and the community. This approach has the trace of a development gains tax -the rate was 50% in the Shinfield casebut it is capable of tracking changes to market states and shares the profits of development between developers, landowners and the community in a way that is more equitable and responsive than current approaches.
